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Electronic voting systems such as Direct Recording Electronic systems have become 
more prominent in election processes because of their potential in consistency of 
implementing security policies. Despite of this potential, most of the systems still 
exclusively rely on the integrity of election officers and poll workers to ensure that the 
election maintains the proper security and privacy. Various cryptography voting 
schemes have been proposed to tackle the problem of how to trust the voting machine 
with correct recording of votes. However, still the probability of cheating is relatively 
high. 
 
This thesis proposes an electronic voting system that provides a trustable voter 
verification system by scrambling ballots as the cryptography method. The system 
selects and unselects candidates, and Rubik’s cube is used for encrypting ballots and 
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generating receipts. The receipts can be used by voters to verify their votes in the final 
tally of votes. 
 
Cheating probabilities were analyzed to evaluate the strength of the proposed system. 
The results of the probability analysis show that cheating probabilities in the proposed 
system are very low. 
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Sistem pengundian elektronik seperti Sistem Perekodan Secara Terus Elektronik telah 
menjadi prominen dalam proses pilihanraya disebabkan oleh potensi mereka dalam  
melaksana secara konsisten polisi sekuriti. Walaupun berpotensi, kebanyakan sistem 
masih lagi secara eksklusif bergantung kepada integriti pegawai pilihanraya dan petugas 
pusat pengundian untuk memastikan pilihanraya menjamin sekuriti dan keadaan 
berahsia yang sewajarnya. Pelbagai skema pengundian kriptografi telah dicadangkan 
untuk menangani masalah bagaimana untuk mempercayai mesin undian dengan 
perekodan undi yang betul. Sungguhpun begitu, kebarangkalian penipuan masih lagi 
secara relatifnya tinggi. 
 
Tesis ini mencadangkan satu sistem undi elektronik yang menyediakan sistem verifikasi 
pengudi yang boleh dipercayai dengan mencampuraduk undian sebagai kaedah 
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kriptografi. Sistem tersebut memilih dan tidak memilih calon, dan kiub Rubik 
digunakan untuk mengenkrip undi dan menjanakan resit. Resit ini boleh digunakan oleh 
pengundi untuk mengesahkan undi mereka dalam jumlah akhir undian. 
 
Kebarangkalian penipuan dianalisis untuk menilai kekuatan sistem yang dicadang. 
Keputusan analisis kebarangkalian menunjukkan kebarangkalian penipuan dalam sistem 
cadangan adalah rendah.  
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 CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background  
Public elections are the basis of democratic societies. Selecting leaders and 
representatives by voting is the most important aim of this kind of government. Eligible 
voters must be sure that their votes are effective in their function. It is clear that in every 
election, one person or group wins and other candidates or groups are losers. Hence, 
after counting votes, there are often some complaints about voting regularity. Losers 
accuse the winning candidate or group to cheat on the votes. 
 
In the 2000 U.S. presidential election, there was a great controversy because George W. 
Bush lost the popular vote but won the Electoral College, including a win in Florida by a 
margin of only 500 votes [24]. Numerous complaints were aired: the “butterfly ballot” in 
Broward County was misled, the punch card system failed to record a number of votes, 
and more than 50,000 absentee ballots went missing [25]. This debacle served as a 
public wake-up call that elections were far from perfect. 
 
As it was doubtful, researchers tried to find a safer way for voting. A Direct Recording 
Elections (DRE) system was used instead of the paper-base voting system. The DRE 
system has more benefits than the paper-based system. The DRE system can count 
ballots faster and more carefully than the paper-based system. Moreover, its expenditure 
is lower than paper-based system's. The DRE system must have some characteristics 
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which are necessary in voting systems. Privacy, verification, flexibility, usability, 
accuracy, and sturdiness are basic requirements of the voting systems. 
 
Voters must be assured that their identifications are secure during the voting process. 
Then, DRE has to ensure that a voter’s final ballot remains secret. Confidence of voting 
trusty is gained by two ways. First, according of receipt voter must be sure that his ballot 
did not change and it was counted as intended. Second, voter would not be able to prove 
the contents of his ballot to anyone according of his receipt and his evidences. Because, 
voters can sell their votes and voting principle- selecting candidate without any forces 
and cheating- will be damaged. Voters' identifications and candidate choices must both 
remain hidden in the voting system. 
 
Today it is common expectation that voters can trace their vote during voting process.  
Voters have to be able to prove to themselves that their vote was cast as intended and 
that it was counted exactly. Hence, everyone needs a way to prove that the final tally is 
accurate. A voter must feel his vote is effective in final result of the election. Comparing 
between original ballot containers with candidate selected by voter, prevents cheating in 
voting systems. The reason is that, any changing in ballot for altering voting result will 
be detected and appeared. It has two advantages: first, voters can be sure their vote did 
not change. Second, anybody will not cheat by changing ballots. Voter will be satisfied 
that his vote is counted exactly but he can not prove ballot container to coercers1. Voter 
can claim who is his candidate selected but it is impossible to prove it.  
 
                                                 
1 Who wants to buy vote from voter 
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Final tally is summation of the all votes cast, and all correct votes have to be counted in 
the final summation. Therefore, ballot checking system has an important role in 
revealing wrong ballots and preventing incorrect ballots from being dropped in the box. 
Encrypting ballots after they are submitted by voter until counting day will guarantee 
voting security. The voting system must also be robust, meaning that is it should be 
stable enough so that a small group of people cannot disrupt the election. 
 
In the 2000 year U.S. presidential election and since then there has been a push to 
integrate security into voting systems and thereby eliminate the reliance on third parties. 
In particular, many critics have focused on the problem of how to trust the voting 
machine with the correct recording of the votes [16]. Of the three common types of 
cryptography voting schemes, mix-nets and homomorphic have been proposed for 
addressing this problem. Chaum [10, 13] has proposed using visual cryptography to 
allow the voter to verify that the ballot has encrypted by choosing one of the encrypted 
layers. Neff [14] has proposed using receipts with codes corresponding to particular 
candidates. Forsythe [16] proposed a method by using homomorphic encryption voting 
systems, which have the advantage of maintaining greater privacy by never revealing the 
contents of individual ballots [16]. 
 
In some2 of the previous methods, the probability of cheating is relatively high [16], 
whereas in some of the methods, voter verification comparing voter receipt with public 
site is relatively difficult. The reason is that, sometimes these methods require 
knowledge of mathematic formula [16] and then the common voter may face difficulty 
                                                 
2 mix-nets and homomorphic 
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in understanding mathematic formula. Comparing long complexity text or tiny pixels for 
decryption or encryption [13] in order to verify the vote is another problem. Ignorance of 
the verification process or difficulty in voter verification has caused voter confusion [13, 
16]. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to present a new method which incorporates cryptography and 
vote security with voter verification. The bases of this method are Rubik’s Cube game 
tools. Simple rules are used for selecting candidate and Rubik’s cube is used for mixing 
candidate for encrypting ballot. Calculation of probability of cheating shows that RCV 
method is more secure and for using famous game tools is exoteric enough to be 
understood by everyone.   
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Election type and its requirements depend on the country and its policy but all of them 
follow some common properties. Every country uses a voting type which is according to 
some situations, but they have a common aim which is democracy creation. One voting 
system must have some properties which are election base. All of these properties have 
to be used in a voting system.  
Electronic voting systems and paper-based voting system have some common points. 
Both of the systems accompany security, during voting days from voter registration day 
to day of final results publication. Each system must seriously consider exactly purpose 
about security issues. These properties are: 
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• Each eligible voter must be able to vote and he cannot vote more than one time in a 
voting period. 
• A voter must be confident that his final ballot will be secret and nobody can access 
to his vote. 
• For preventing from vote selling, a voter never should be able to disclose content of 
his ballot.  
• Voting machine, hardwares, or officials can not change content of ballots. 
• Final result must be the sum of all the correct votes. 
• Voter must be able to prove to himself that his vote is counted as intended and it has 
not changed during voting process.  
• Voting system must be robust; it means that a small group of people cannot disrupt 
the election. 
• Partial totals should not be known early. 
 
In the voting systems, some of these properties may be violated. There are lots of 
researches discussing the problems of violated properties. Voting receipt can cover more 
than one of them. Using ballot as a receipt prevents from some cheating problems on 
these properties.  
 
Except the first property that depends on voting registration system, others will be 
discussed in this research. These properties are related to the election security.  
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Electronic voting system which called Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) system, have 
recently become more prominent in research institutes and some countries. One of the 
major advantages of DRE systems is the potential of the consistent implementation of 
the security policies. A machine performs only what it is programmed to do, whereas 
human behavior is situation-dependent and may bias the election system. Despite this 
potential, most of DRE systems still exclusively rely on the integrity of election officers 
and training poll workers to ensure that the election maintains the proper security and 
privacy. In order to believe that the votes are properly recorded and tallied, the voters 
must trust the election officials, the technicians setting up the machines, the 
programmers writing the software, and the engineers designing the hardware. They need 
to trust that the machines are stored in a way that prevents from tampering, and have 
been properly monitored since being removed from storage. They need to trust that the 
machines will be securely delivered to the counting location after the polls close. 
 
Cheating probability in the previous methods is high that makes these methods 
unreliable [13, 14, 16, 21]. The cheating probability of Chaum method is 1/2, Roland 
method’s is 1/3 and Forsyth method’s is 1/d in which d is the number of grid rows in the 
method.  
 
Among the previous voting methods, David Chaum has proposed [10, 13] visual 
cryptography to allow the voter to verify that the ballot encrypts the intended choices. 
Joy Marie Forsythe [16] proposed homomorphic cryptography to generate receipt. 
Chaum and Forsythe methods need to compare tiny pixels, long complexity strings or 
mathematic knowledge. Therefore, they are difficult for a common user.  
